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confronting	 uncertainties	 in	 the	 prosecution	 of	 patent	 applications	
and	in	patent	enforcement	as	a	result	of	the	law	governing	patent	eli-


























dicial	 exceptions,	 however,	 abstract	 ideas,	 natural	 phenomena,	 and	
laws	of	nature	are	categorically	excluded	from	patent	protection.7	It	


























also	Gene	Quinn,	A	Window	Is	Open	 to	Save	U.S.	Patents—Don’t	Let	 It	Slam	Shut,	 IP-
WATCHDOG	(Feb.	2,	2020),	https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/02/02/window-open	






















ing	 the	scope	of	patent-eligible	subject	matter	 in	Alice.10	In	 the	 first	
step,	the	Court	asks	whether	the	patent	claim	at	issue	is	or	incorpo-







ing	 eligible	 subject	 matter	 after	 Alice	 creates	 uncertainties	 and	











judicially	 created	 exceptions	 to	 subject	matter	 eligibility,	 including	 ‘abstract	 ideas,’	
‘laws	of	nature,’	or	‘natural	phenomena,’	shall	be	used	to	determine	patent	eligibility	
under	section	101,	and	all	cases	establishing	or	interpreting	those	exceptions	to	eligi-

























ficiency.18	Not	all	 scholars,	however,	agree	 that	Alice	harms	 innova-
tion.	Mark	Lemley	 argues	 that	 stringent	 restrictions	preventing	 the	
patenting	of	abstract	inventions	will	result	in	a	more	competitive	re-











	 17.	 See	 Ognjen	 Zivojnovic,	Patentable	 Subject	Matter	 After	Alice–Distinguishing	
























tics,	 Inc.,	788	F.3d	1371	(Fed.	Cir.	2015)	 (Nos.	2014-1139,	2014-1144)	 (noting	 that	





other	 judicial	 exceptions	will	 be	 enacted,	 and	 the	widespread	 con-
cerns	about	Alice	persist.	
While	the	Alice	test	for	eligible	subject	matter	is	most	applicable	
to	 computer-implemented	 inventions	 (i.e.,	 computer	 software), 23	
lower	court	decisions	post-Alice	show	that	none	of	the	patent	claims	
in	any	technology	area	are	spared	from	review	under	the	Alice	frame-
work	 (e.g.,	 an	 improved	 high-performance	 computer	 memory	 sys-
tem).24	Business	methods	that	are	software-implemented	and	involve	




plementation.26 	Ognjen	 Zivojnovic	 believes	 that	 Alice	 kills	 all	 pure	
business	 methods	 patents	 because	 all	 business	 methods	 patents	
merely	recite	an	abstract	economic	practice	and	simply	employ	a	gen-
eral	 purpose	 computer	 to	 implement	 the	 business	method.27 	Peter	
Menell	agrees	that	the	U.S.	Constitution	and	the	Patent	Act	were	not	
meant	to	protect	business	methods.28	By	contrast,	Alex	Dejean	argues	
that	 technological	applications,	 such	as	online	shopping,	 individual-
ized	advertising,	and	automated	customer	service,	 led	to	a	transfor-










	 25.	 Nam	 Kim,	 Software	 and	 Business	 Method	 Inventions	 After	 Alice,	 SHEPPARD	



















including	business	methods.29	Along	 the	 same	 lines,	David	Reardon	
and	Gene	Quinn	urge	that	Alice	must	be	reversed	because	the	trans-
formative	characteristics	of	software	are	technological	in	nature.30	






Pharmaceutical	 Research	 and	 Manufacturers	 of	 America	 (PhRMA)	
both	argue	that	the	restrictions	on	eligible	subject	matter	after	Alice	
should	be	loosened.33		
The	Alice	 test	 impacts	 the	entire	 lifecycle	of	a	patent,	 including	
patent	application	preparation,	patent	prosecution	in	the	U.S.	Patent	












invasive	method	of	 accessing	 fetal	DNA	using	previously	discarded	cell-free	 cffDNA	
and	 a	method	 for	 gene	 detection	 by	 amplifying	 and	 analyzing	 significantly	 shorter	








the	 design	 of	 bio-inspired	 software	 with	 self-organizing	 and	 emergent	 proper-
ties	.	.	.	.”).	
	 32.	 Hallie	Wimberly,	Comment,	The	Changing	Landscape	of	Patent	Subject	Matter	




















tent	 applicants’	 responses	 to	 the	Alice	 regime	 or	 patent	 applicants’	






















	 37.	 Mark	A.	 Lemley	&	 Samantha	 Zyontz,	 Does	Alice	 Target	 Patent	 Trolls?	 (un-
published	manuscript)	(on	file	with	authors).	




















business	 methods,	 and	 biotechnology	 areas,	 and	 sub-categories	















nology	 areas	 filed	 fewer	 patent	 applications	 post-Alice,	 with	 the	






































statutory	 patentability	 requirements,	 such	 as	 novelty	 in	 §	 102	 and	
non-obviousness	in	§	103.	Unfortunately,	the	Alice	decision	itself	cre-































fine	 what	 constitutes	 an	 abstract	 idea. 44 	The	 Alice	 opinion	 also	
appears	 to	 implicate	 other	 statutory	 requirements	 for	patentability	













The	 two-step	 test	 in	Alice	 could	arguably	be	 seen	as	providing	
greater	clarity	to	patent	eligibility	standards	in	harmony	with	other	
foreign	patent	regimes,	but	in	reality,	its	application	comes	with	many	
challenges.	 Under	 Article	 52	 of	 the	 European	 Patent	 Convention	
































of	 the	 categories	 of	 “abstract	 ideas”	 or	 explain	 how	 to	 determine	
whether	the	patent	claim	contained	an	“abstract	 idea.”54	The	vague-
ness	of	the	concept	of	“abstract	idea”	may	be	traced	back	to	Article	I,	
Section	 8,	 Clause	 8	 of	 the	 U.S.	 Constitution,	 which	 is	 the	 basis	 for	
providing	 exclusive	 rights	 for	 inventions	 and	 creations	 and	 for	


































some	results),	 then	 the	claim	should	be	 ineligible.59	Thus,	 there	are	




















































lem	 of	 data	 loss	 in	 browsing	 websites	 failed	 to	 claim	 a	 technical	



























































































tion	 and	patent	 examination,	 as	 patent	 eligibility	 counterclaims	 (or	
through	motions	to	dismiss	under	Rule	12(c))	and	PTO	§	101	rejec-












defines	what	constitutes	an	“abstract	 idea”	 in	 the	 future,	until	 then,	
 
	 81.	 See	Maria	R.	Sinatra,	Do	Abstract	Ideas	Have	the	Need,	the	Need	for	Speed?:	An	






	 83.	 See	Robert	 Sachs,	 Twenty-Two	Ways	 Congress	 Can	 Save	 Section	 101,	 BILSKI	
BLOG	 (Feb.	 12,	 2015),	 https://www.bilskiblog.com/2015/02/twenty-two-ways	





























§	101. 90 	The	 instructions	 provide	 four	 examples	 of	 abstract	 ideas,	
learning	from	the	Alice	decision,	including	(1)	fundamental	economic	














non-eligible	 and	 rejected	 without	 consideration	 of	 those	 judicial	
 
	 88.	 See	Brooks	Kenyon,	Deference	Runs	Deep:	The	Ill	Effects	of	Alice,	B.C.	INTELL.	
























tent	 claim	 is	 directed	 to	 a	 judicial	 exception,	 such	 as	 an	 “abstract	
idea.”102	The	Interim	Guidance	expands	the	four	examples	of	abstract	
ideas	in	the	Preliminary	Examination	Instructions	to	many	examples	














others).108	When	a	claim	is	rejected	because	 it	 falls	within	a	 judicial	


















































































can	 reduce	 litigation	 costs	when	 courts	 apply	Alice.123	Practitioners	
and	scholars	have	presented	empirical	evidence	suggesting	the	exist-
ence	of	significant	uncertainty	regarding	how	Alice	should	be	applied	


















	 121.	 Ouellette,	 supra	 note	120,	 at	 1125–26	 (introducing	how	 the	public	 sectors	
function	to	provide	innovation	incentives).	













































	 128.	 Dani	 Kass,	 IP	 Litigation	 More	 Costly,	 Risky	 Than	 Ever	 Before,	 MoFo	 Says,	
LAW360	 (Aug.	 8,	 2019,	 9:25	 PM),	 https://www.law360.com/articles/1186755/ip	
-litigation-more-costly-risky-than-ever-before-mofo-says	[https://perma.cc/V9F2	
-SPGB]	(“The	actual	number	of	suits	is	diminishing	though,	which	the	firm	attributed	
in	part	 to	 the	U.S.	Supreme	Court’s	TC	Heartland	 and	Alice	decisions,	both	of	which	
made	it	harder	for	plaintiffs	in	litigation.”).	
	 129.	 Robert	Sachs,	#AliceStorm	in	June:	A	Deeper	Dive	into	Court	Trends,	and	New	

















served	 that	 biotechnology	 is	more	 likely	 to	 survive	 eligibility	 chal-
lenges	 post-Alice	 compared	 to	 IT.138	This	 finding	 is	 consistent	with	
another	study	in	which	Lemley	and	Zyontz	reviewed	808	decisions	on	
patentable	subject	matter	delivered	by	the	Federal	Circuit	and	the	fed-






































still-evolving	Alice	 test	 for	patent	 eligibility.145	Practitioners	believe	
that	Alice	has	dramatically	reduced	the	value	of	issued	patents	in	par-
ticular	technologies	and	changed	how	patent	applications	are	drafted	
and	 prosecuted.146	That	 said,	 some	 practitioners	 are	 confident	 that	
the	uncertainties	 imposed	by	Alice	will	eventually	diminish	through	










ble.150	However,	 even	 though	 the	 Federal	 Circuit	 has	 found	 several	
computer	patents	to	be	eligible	in	post-Alice	decisions	such	as	Enfish	
and	BASCOM,151	Kim	cautions	that	the	same	has	not	yet	happened	in	
biotechnology	cases.152	Even	worse,	 in	a	 recent	 case,	Electric	Power	
Group	LLC	v.	Alstom	S.A.,	the	Federal	Circuit	expanded	the	first	step	of	































and	 techniques	 should	 be	 protected	 for	 inventiveness.155 	However,	
some	judges	in	their	concurrences	invited	the	Supreme	Court	or	Con-
gress	 to	 fix	 the	 law	 governing	 patent	 eligibility.156	Those	 disparate	
opinions	broadly	suggest	that	the	Federal	Circuit	judges	agree	that	Al-
ice	and	Mayo	created	confusion.157	However,	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court	
has	 repeatedly	declined	 to	 re-visit	 the	 topic	of	eligible	 subject	mat-
ter.158	
3. Uncertainties	at	the	PTO	
The	PTAB	hears	 appeals	 from	patent	 applicants	 engaged	 in	 ex	
















	 158.	 E.g.,	Athena	 Diagnostics,	 915	 F.3d	 743,	 cert.	 denied,	 140	 S.	 Ct.	 855	 (2020);	




v.	 Fitbit,	 Inc.,	 927	 F.3d	 1306	 (Fed.	 Cir.	 2019),	 cert.	 denied,	 140	 S.	 Ct.	 907;	 (2020);	
ChargePoint,	Inc.	v.	SemaConnect,	Inc.,	920	F.3d	759	(Fed.	Cir.	2019),	cert.	denied,	140	












PTAB	 to	 challenge	patent	 validity,	 are	 far	more	numerous	 than	 the	
other	mechanisms	 that	 challenge	patent	 validity,	 such	 as	PGRs	 and	
CBMs,	and	far	more	prevalent	than	initially	predicted	by	the	PTO,	but	
IPRs	 cannot	 be	 employed	 to	 raise	 subject	 matter	 eligibility	 chal-
lenges.162	About	87%	of	 the	PTAB	petitions	challenged	patents	 that	
were	being	enforced	in	district	court	after	a	pre-suit	investigation.163	
Under	 these	 circumstances,	 the	 former	 Federal	 Circuit	 Chief	 Judge	
Paul	Michel	believes	that	Alice	imposes	massive	uncertainty	over	the	
validity	of	countless	thousands	of	patents,	most	of	which	were	issued	


































































perma.cc/B2CV-89QF];	 see	 also	Patent	 Technology	 Centers	Management,	 U.S.	PAT.	&	
TRADEMARK	 OFF.,	 https://www.uspto.gov/patent/contact-patents/patent-technology	
-centers-management	 [https://perma.cc/ES3G-UANS]	 (outlining	 that	 TC	 2100	 in-















mid-July	2017	 to	explore	 the	 role	of	Alice	 in	patent	examination.176	
They	observed	that	business	methods,	bioinformatics,	and	software	
patent	 applications	were	abandoned	more	 frequently	when	 the	pa-

































































ventional	when	evaluating	whether	 the	 judicial	exceptions	are	 inte-
grated	into	a	practical	application.192		
The	goal	of	Step	2B	is	clarified	in	the	Revised	Guidance	to	focus	






iners	 to	 Present	 a	 Proper	 Prima	 Facie	 Case	 Supported	 by	 Factual	 Evidence,	 BAKER	












































































	 201.	 2014	 Interim	 Guidance	 on	 Patent	 Subject	 Matter	 Eligibility,	 79	 Fed.	 Reg.	
74,618	(proposed	Dec.	16,	2014)	(to	be	codified	at	37	C.F.R.	pt.	1).	











	 All	Office	Actions	 Final	Rejections	 All	§	101	Rejec-tions	
Final	§	101	Rejec-
tions	
2012	 1,043,846	 238,031	 69,083	 10,267	
2013	 787,625	 200,078	 38,226	 8,005	
2014	 401,930	 65,023	 39,230	 5,142	
2015	 1,022,696	 249,092	 106,436	 34,767	







2012	 60	 306,713	 550,160	 227,790	
2013	 55	 198,386	 423,427	 161,089	
2014	 4,460	 152,235	 211,768	 106,164	
2015	 22,148	 349,693	 574,238	 280,619	
2016	 30,558	 301,431	 651,595	 291,254	
	
	
	 Table	1	 shows	 the	number	of	office	actions	between	2012	and	
2016	and	discloses	the	specific	numbers	of	rejections	under	the	dif-
ferent	statutory	requirements	and	based	on	Alice.	Table	2	shows	the	
number	 of	 office	 actions	 by	 technology	 areas,	 addressing	 selection	
bias	 concerns	 and	 supporting	 the	 robustness	of	 the	 empirical	 anal-


































gories	within	 those	 technology	 areas	 (e.g.,	 specific	 art	 units	within	
































	 212.	 See	 infra	 Parts	 II.A.2,	 II.B;	 see	also	TC	3600	Management	Roster,	U.S.	PAT.	&	
TRADEMARK	OFF.,	https://www.uspto.gov/patent/contact-patents/tc-3600	
-management-roster	[https://perma.cc/8MN6-P3XX].	

















pared	 to	 patent	 applications	 in	 business	 methods	 or	 software.	


























2100	 Management	 Roster,	 U.S.	 PAT.	 &	 TRADEMARK	 OFF.,	 https://www.uspto.gov/	
patent/contact-patents/tc-2100-management-roster	[https://perma.cc/636H	
















cited	Alice	 and	 imposed	 a	 rejection.	 This	 rate	 increased	 slightly	 to	
15.21%	for	applications	filed	before	Alice	but	examined	after	the	PTO	
























































































































Rejections based on Alice as a fraction of all office actions for patent applications filed before Alice















































































9.13% 8.88% 5.83% 5.42% 2.98%















































































































































































Sec. 101 regections as a fraction of all office actions before Alice
Post-Alice Sec. 101 regections as a fraction of all office actions for patent applications filed before Alice



































































































































































fice	 actions	 for	 software	 applications	 were	 §	 101	 rejections.	 After	
















creased	 dramatically	 to	 26.5%	 for	 applications	 filed	 post-Alice.	 In	








rejections,	which	 then	 increased	 to	 24.39%	 for	 patent	 applications	
filed	after	Alice.	
Moreover,	 patent	 applications	 in	 computer	 networks,	 GUI	 and	
document	processing,	data	bases	and	file	management,	cryptography	
and	security,	and	computer	graphics	processing	received	a	high	per-
centage	 (about	8–10%)	of	 final	 rejections	under	 §	101	before	Alice	
was	decided.	The	rate	increased	to	19.32%	post-Alice	for	applications	
in	 cryptography	 and	 security	 filed	 before	 Alice	 and	 increased	 to	
22.53%	for	applications	filed	post-Alice.	The	rate	increased	to	18.18%	
after	 Alice	 was	 decided	 among	 applications	 in	 computer	 networks	
filed	before	Alice	 and	 increased	 to	23.28%	 for	 applications	 in	 com-
puter	 graphics	 processing	 filed	 post-Alice.	 Compared	 to	 these	 in-
creased	percentages	of	rejections,	patent	applications	in	GUI	and	doc-











ics.	 After	Alice,	 there	were	 about	 339	 patent	 applications	 filed	 per	











2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Time (monthly)
Manufacturing Broad Bio-Informatics Narrow Bio-Informatics Business Methods Software (in general)






































tions	 33843.55	 30241.35	 10.64%	 33843.55	 23837.83	 29.56%	
Broad	Bioinformat-
ics	 391.93	 338.87	 13.54%	 391.93	 313.25	 20.08%	
%	of	All	Patent	Ap-
plications	 1.16%	 1.12%	 	 1.16%	 1.31%	 	
Narrow	Bioinformat-
ics	 90.34	 81.13	 10.20%	 90.34	 79.50	 12.00%	
%	of	All	Patent	Ap-
plications	 0.27%	 0.27%	 	 0.27%	 0.33%	 	
Business	Methods	 4206.00	 3843.26	 8.62%	 4206.00	 2961.83	 29.58%	
%	of	All	Patent	Ap-
plications	 12.43%	 12.71%	 	 12.43%	 12.42%	 	
Software	(in	gen-
eral)	 8779.97	 7910.36	 9.90%	 8779.97	 6014.00	 31.50%	
%	of	All	Patent	Ap-
plications	 25.94%	 26.16%	 	 25.94%	 25.23%	 	

















Even	 though	 the	 language	 of	 Alice	 does	 not	 directly	 address	
§§	102,	103,	or	112,	these	statutes	are	relevant	to	the	patentability	of	




















rejections	 were	 given	 by	 examiners	 under	 §	 101	 and	 Alice	 for	
 
	 216.	 See	supra	Part	I.A.1.	
























the	Alice	 decision,	was	 this	parallel	 trend	maintained	or	was	 it	dis-
rupted?	
The	 intervention	of	 the	Alice	 decision	 is	 considered	under	 two	
dates.	One	date	is	the	month	(June	2014)	when	the	opinion	was	deliv-
ered	by	 the	U.S.	 Supreme	Court,220	and	 the	other	date	 is	 the	month	
(December	2014)	when	the	PTO	introduced	the	Interim	Guidance	im-























software.	 Patent	 applications	 in	 these	 three	 technology	 areas	were	











































































































This	 study	 deploys	 logistic	 regressions	 to	 explore	 the	 correla-
tions	between	the	Alice	office	action	rejections	and	the	different	stat-
utory	rejections.	Section	101	rejections	for	all	of	the	art	units	for	bio-



































association	 between	Alice	 rejections	 and	 §	 101	 rejections.	 In	 other	
words,	 patent	 applications	 in	 recording	 and	 compression	were	 the	
least	likely	to	simultaneously	receive	more	Alice	rejections	and	more	





















































§	101	 6.000***	 5.292***	 4.591***	 4.341***	 5.143***	 	
	 (0.581)	 (0.0842)	 (0.224)	 (0.0896)	 (0.0542)	 	
§	102	 0.148*	 -0.148***	 -0.0843**	 -0.145***	 -0.0217	 	
	 (0.0822)	 (0.0178)	 (0.0412)	 (0.0225)	 (0.0245)	 	
§	103	 -0.457***	 0.0386**	 0.142***	 0.0566**	 -0.0669**	 	
	 (0.0680)	 (0.0182)	 (0.0356)	 (0.0243)	 (0.0277)	 	
Obj.	 6,636	 205,006	 17,820	 54,523	 711,048	 	




















§	101	 7.181***	 5.363***	 5.341***	 3.440***	 5.218***	 7.550***	
	 (0.454)	 (0.173)	 (0.263)	 (0.131)	 (0.129)	 (0.999)	
§	102	 0.0705	 -0.227***	 0.0646	 -0.312***	 -0.0701	 -0.556*	
	 (0.0732)	 (0.0610)	 (0.142)	 (0.110)	 (0.0534)	 (0.322)	
§	103	 0.338***	 0.377***	 0.316**	 0.523***	 -0.607***	 -0.265	
	 (0.0908)	 (0.0821)	 (0.151)	 (0.120)	 (0.0585)	 (0.256)	
Obj.	 47,999	 49,478	 55,357	 47,025	 60,697	 20,457	
R2	 0.473	 0.438	 0.462	 0.382	 0.429	 0.500	
Note:	Month,	art	unit,	and	§112	are	also	controlled	as	fixed.	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.	
	
































103,	 and	 112(b)	 rejection.	 In	 bioinformatics,	 narrowly	 defined,	 the	
correlation	 between	 §	 101	 rejections	 and	 §	 112(b)	 rejections	 was	
much	 stronger	 than	 the	 correlation	 between	 §	 101	 rejections	 and	
§	102	rejections.	In	other	technology	areas,	the	latter	correlation	was	
much	stronger	than	the	former	correlation.	Patent	applications	in	nar-












were	 likely	 to	 receive	one	more	§	112(a)	 rejection,	 this	probability	
was	 lower	 than	the	probability	of	simultaneously	receiving	another	
statutory	rejection	other	than	§	112(a).	Among	the	office	actions	is-
sued	 after	 Alice,	 the	 correlation	 between	 §	 101	 and	 §	 112(a)	 was	
stronger	than	(1)	the	correlation	between	§	101	rejections	and	§	102	





tecture,	 there	 was	 no	 correlation	 between	 §	 101	 rejections	 and	
§	112(a)	rejections	at	a	statistically	significant	level	among	the	office	








































































eas	 to	 be	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 rejected	 under	 §	 101.	 Similar	 to	 the	
regressions	with	respect	to	applications	filed	before	the	Alice	decision,	
but	examined	post-Alice,	the	coefficients	for	the	D-i-D	effect	of	the	PTO	
implementation	 of	Alice	 have	 a	 similar	 degree	 of	 statistical	 signifi-
cance	and	value	as	the	coefficients	for	the	D-i-D	effect	of	the	Alice	de-
cision.	This	similarity	suggests	that	Alice’s	effect	was	consistent	as	to	
























































VARIABLES	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
Time	 0.0140	 -0.0614	 0.565*	 0.560*	
	 (0.255)	 (0.258)	 (0.303)	 (0.304)	
Technology	 -10.73***	 4.185***	 4.198***	 4.196***	
	 (2.122)	 (0.0934)	 (0.0941)	 (0.0941)	
Time	×	Tech-
nology	 1.593***	 1.681***	 1.352***	 1.359***	
	 (0.126)	 (0.130)	 (0.185)	 (0.186)	
Constant	 8.806***	 -6.129***	 -6.345***	 -6.344***	
	 (2.089)	 (0.187)	 (0.190)	 (0.190)	
Observations	 75,667	 71,577	 46,593	 46,509	
Pseudo	R-





	 Decision	 Implementation	 Decision	 Implementation	
VARIABLES	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Time	 -1.010	 -1.404*	 -0.443	 -0.443	
	 (0.814)	 (0.835)	 (1.308)	 (1.308)	
Technology	 -15.45***	 -14.77***	 1.724***	 1.724***	
	 (1.169)	 (1.209)	 (0.503)	 (0.503)	
Time	×	Tech-
nology	 2.581***	 3.013***	 2.593**	 2.593**	
	 (0.612)	 (0.643)	 (1.031)	 (1.031)	
Constant	 13.90***	 13.18***	 -3.148***	 -3.148***	
	 (1.231)	 (1.284)	 (0.742)	 (0.742)	
	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 2,383	 2,301	 705	 705	
Pseudo	R-



















































once	 under	 §	 101,	Alice	 caused	 the	 probability	 of	 them	 receiving	 a	
§	101	rejection	in	their	final	decision	to	be	increased	by	about	93%.	In	
other	words,	the	Alice	decision	made	those	applications	about	twelve	
times	more	 likely	to	 fail	 in	overcoming	their	 initial	§	101	rejections	









the	Alice	 decision	made	 the	 applications	 filed	before	Alice	 nineteen	
times	more	 likely	to	 fail	 in	overcoming	their	 initial	§	101	rejections	
received	from	the	examiners.		
By	contrast,	the	Alice	decision	did	not	have	a	statistically	signifi-








Alice	 implementation	 on	 applications	 in	 narrowly	 defined	 bioinfor-
matics.		
b. Business	Methods	



















business	 method	 applications	 filed	 after	 Alice.	 These	 applications,	
which	were	filed	and	examined	after	Alice,	were	still	55%	more	likely	
to	 receive	 an	 initial	 or	 final	 §	 101	 rejection	 compared	 to	 business	

























	 Decision	 Implementation	 Decision	 Implementation	
VARIABLES	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
Time	 0.584***	 0.464***	 0.595***	 0.571***	
	 (0.125)	 (0.130)	 (0.161)	 (0.163)	
Technology	 3.095***	 3.094***	 3.110***	 3.110***	
	 (0.0876)	 (0.0876)	 (0.0875)	 (0.0875)	
Time	×	Technology	 1.518***	 1.643***	 -0.383**	 -0.359**	
	 (0.117)	 (0.122)	 (0.154)	 (0.156)	
Constant	 -6.172***	 -6.189***	 -6.258***	 -6.265***	
	 (0.0937)	 (0.0938)	 (0.0940)	 (0.0940)	
Observations	 550,136	 504,181	 380,488	 379,363	





	 Decision	 Implementation	 Decision	 Implementation	
VARIABLES	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Time	 -0.289	 -0.678	 0.181	 0.181	
	 (1.746)	 (1.746)	 (1.806)	 (1.806)	
Technology	 0.936**	 0.938**	 0.928**	 0.928**	
	 (0.433)	 (0.433)	 (0.431)	 (0.431)	
Time	×	Technology	 2.700***	 3.093***	 1.231*	 1.231*	
	 (0.524)	 (0.538)	 (0.641)	 (0.641)	
Constant	 -3.204*	 -3.215*	 -3.168*	 -3.169*	
	 (1.720)	 (1.715)	 (1.737)	 (1.738)	
	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 43,217	 41,223	 13,174	 13,157	































cations	 filed	 after	 Alice	 about	 two	 times	 more	 likely	 to	 fail	 in	
overcoming	their	initial	§	101	rejections.	










































































































































fore	 the	 Alice	 decision.	 The	 probability	 of	 applications	 receiving	 a	












applications.	 In	 other	words,	 among	 patent	 applications	 in	 art	 unit	
2686,	the	possibility	that	applications	filed	and	examined	after	Alice	
would	receive	an	initial	or	final	§	101	rejection	is	slightly	lower	com-
pared	to	 that	same	possibility	 for	applications	 filed	before	 the	Alice	
decision	but	examined	after	Alice.	
Moreover,	 the	 implementation	of	Alice	had	a	stronger	effect	on	













































not	 show	a	statistically	 significant	D-i-D	effect	of	 the	Alice	decision.	
However,	 some	 art	 units	 for	 sub-categories	 in	 software,	 including	
computer	 networks,	 data	 bases	 and	 file	management,	 and	 cryptog-
raphy	and	security,	showed	small	positive	and	statistically	significant	
coefficients	for	the	D-i-D	effect	of	the	Alice	decision.	The	coefficients	












gies	 to	 estimate	 the	 probability	 of	 receiving	 final	 rejections	 under	
§	101.238	Error	bars	in	Figure	5	refer	to	the	standard	error	of	the	re-
gressions	results,	representing	the	variability	of	the	data.	Long	error	


































































































































































































ditional	 costs	 on	 patent	 applicants	 during	 patent	 prosecution. 239	
When	 patent	 applicants	 cannot	 successfully	 overcome	 these	 rejec-
tions,	the	costs	are	transformed	into	expenses	in	accounting	terms.240	
The	increased	costs	or	expenses	are	a	direct	result	of	the	uncertainties	
















































further	and	resulted	 in	a	 larger	 likelihood	of	 initially	and	finally	re-
ceiving	§	101	rejections	for	applications	in	narrowly	defined	bioinfor-
matics.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 PTO	 further	 increased	 the	 application	
and/or	 prosecution	 costs	 in	 narrowly	 defined	 bioinformatics	when	




































with	 PTO	office	 actions	 during	 a	 period	 of	 time	 that	 is	 longer	 than	











































jection	 rate	 for	mechanical	 inventions	 in	 the	 control	 group	 (below	
1%).	This	suggests	that	the	increase	in	§	101	rejections	for	software	
inventions	may	have	occurred	at	a	time	prior	to	the	Alice	decision,	per-

























tions,	 however,	 does	 not	 necessarily	 mean	 that	 the	 Alice	 decision	

























address	 patent	 eligibility	 issues,	 they	 become	 overwhelmingly	
 
	 255.	 See	supra	note	82	and	accompanying	text.	
	 256.	 David	O.	Taylor,	Patent	Eligibility	and	 Investment,	41	CARDOZO	L.	REV.	2019,	
2027	(2019)	(“[O]verall,	74%	of	the	investors	agreed	that	patent	eligibility	is	an	im-
portant	 consideration	 in	 firm	decisions	whether	 to	 invest	 in	 companies	developing	
technology	.	.	.	.”).	










negative	about	 investing	 in	 the	 industries	of	 software,	 the	 Internet,	
and	biotechnology.261	In	other	words,	Taylor’s	finding	that	the	uncer-

























Patent	 applicants	 in	 bioinformatics,	 narrowly	 and	 broadly	 de-
fined,	became	pessimistic	about	filing	more	patent	applications	after	
Alice.	The	average	number	of	patent	applications	filed	in	bioinformat-
ics,	 narrowly	 defined,	 decreased	 by	 74.21%	 per	 month	 during	 the	
 
	 261.	 See	 Taylor,	 supra	 note	 256,	 at	 2082–83	 (showing	 that	 63%	 of	 eligibility	
knowledgeable	investors	reported	negative	impacts	within	the	software	and	Internet	














ber	decreased	 to	 thirty-one	after	 the	Alice	decision.267	The	sharpest	
decrease	occurred	in	June	2014,	when	the	Alice	decision	was	delivered	
by	the	Supreme	Court.	Applications	filed	in	June	2014	were	48.56%	



































































































Patent	 applicants	 filed	 fewer	 patent	 applications	 in	 business	





































2015,	 the	 first	month	after	Alice	was	 implemented	by	 the	PTO,	 this	








filed	 fewer	 applications	 after	 the	Alice	 decision,	 especially	 those	 in	









ter	 innovation	 in	 those	 technology	 areas. 275 	Innovative	 companies	
practicing	business	methods	in	those	areas	may	use	trade	secrets,	ra-







business	 methods	 of	 cryptography,	 wherein	 Alice	 did	 not	 increase	
 









































The	 goal	 of	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 in	 Alice	 was	 to	 exclude	 those	
claims	that	constitute	the	“building	blocks	of	human	ingenuity,”	which	
create	risks	of	preemption.278	Therefore,	 increased	rejections	under	




































the	Alice	decision	and	 its	 implementation	by	 the	PTO	on	examiners	
and	patent	applicants.280	In	some	technology	areas,	such	as	bioinfor-
matics,	business	methods,	and	software	of	telemetry	and	code	gener-




































concepts, 287 	certain	 methods	 of	 organizing	 human	 activity, 288 	and	
mental	processes.289	Any	rejections	for	reciting	an	“abstract	idea”	that	
is	not	enumerated	in	the	Revised	Guidance	must	be	approved	by	the	


























Both	 the	 additional	 procedure	 and	 the	 additional	 indication	























































ever,	once	again,	 the	probability	of	 those	examiners	 issuing	a	§	101	

















































































































gate	 its	 uncertain	 application.	 Indeed,	 the	 Federal	 Circuit	 has	 ex-















	 	 Pre-Alice	 Post-Alice	Rejections	for	Ap-plications	Filed	Before	Alice	
Post-Alice	Rejections	for	Ap-
plications	Filed	After	Alice	




§	101	 0	 0	 32,056	 2	 0.01	 32,864	 5	 0.06	 8,902	
Alice	 132	 0.41	 32,056	 170	 0.52	 32,864	 64	 0.72	 8,902	
Panel	2-All	§	102	Rejections	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mechanical	 10,443	 32.58	 32,056	 11,318	 34.44	
32,86
4	 3,579	 40.2	 8,902	
Bioinformatics	 1,253	 25.69	 4,877	 1,531	 26.06	 5,875	 248	 32.59	 761	
Bioinformatics	
(broad)	 8,584	 27.29	 31,450	 6,767	 29.31	
23,08


















12,469	 24.61	 50,675	 16,613	 27.06	
61,39




















8,178	 27.39	 29,858	 10,978	 28.57	
38,42




13,214	 29.01	 45,552	 10,891	 25.69	
42,39
7	 2,399	 29.4	 8,159	
Cryptography	
and	Security	 9,895	 21.84	 45,315	 8,464	 25.04	
33,80
4	 3,800	 22.93	 16,574	
Computer	Net-




3	 2,680	 25.2	 10,637	
Digital	Cam-
eras	 9,534	 28.43	 33,539	 8,332	 28.06	
29,68




3,573	 14.7	 24,303	 4,072	 21.13	 19,269	 1,201	 21.47	 5,593	
Panel	3-All	§	103	Rejections	 	 	 	 	
Mechanical	 14,991	 46.77	 32,056	 17,115	 52.08	
32,86
4	 4,469	 50.2	 8,902	
Bioinformatics	 2,832	 58.07	 4,877	 3,072	 52.29	 5,875	 406	 53.35	 761	
Bioinformatics	





























35,646	 70.34	 50,675	 45,715	 74.46	
61,39




















21,583	 72.29	 29,858	 28,119	 73.18	
38,42




26,551	 58.29	 45,552	 26,156	 61.69	
42,39
7	 4,334	 53.12	 8,159	
Cryptography	




4	 9,359	 56.47	 16,574	
Computer	Net-




3	 5,621	 52.84	 10,637	
Digital	Cam-








9,869	 40.61	 24,303	 12,787	 66.36	
19,26
9	 3,917	 70.03	 5,593	
Panel	4-All	§	112	Rejections	 	 	 	 	
Mechanical	 24,395	 76.1	 32,056	 10,463	 31.84	
32,86
4	 3,049	 34.25	 8,902	
Bioinformatics	 2,165	 44.39	 4,877	 2,677	 45.57	 5,875	 348	 45.73	 761	
Bioinformatics	






















14,343	 28.3	 50,675	 22,780	 37.11	
61,39






















5,204	 11.42	 45,552	 6,432	 15.17	 42,397	 1,167	 14.3	 8,159	
Cryptography	
and	Security	 7,282	 16.07	 45,315	 7,129	 21.09	
33,80
4	 3,411	 20.58	 16,574	
Computer	Net-




3	 2,029	 19.07	 10,637	
Digital	Cam-
eras	 4,666	 13.91	 33,539	 6,101	 20.55	
29,68






































































































§	101	 6.000***	 5.292***	 4.591***	 4.341***	 5.143***	
	
	




















(0.0680)	 (0.0182)	 (0.0356)	 (0.0243)	 (0.0277)	
	
Obj.	 6,636	 205,006	 17,820	 54,523	 711,048	
	
R-




















§	101	 7.181***	 5.363***	 5.341***	 3.440***	 5.218***	 7.550***	
	







(0.0732)	 (0.0610)	 (0.142)	 (0.110)	 (0.0534)	 (0.322)	




(0.0908)	 (0.0821)	 (0.151)	 (0.120)	 (0.0585)	 (0.256)	
Obj.	 47,999	 49,478	 55,357	 47,025	 60,697	 20,457	
R-

















∝ +𝛽$𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒"$ + 𝛽%𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ# + 𝛽&(𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒"$ ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ#)
+ 𝜆𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠!" + 𝛾" + 𝜀	(1)	
𝑝!"#"$ = E[𝑅𝑒𝑗101!"#"$|𝑋!"#"$]	(2)	
	
where	𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 = {1,… , 𝑛} 	,	𝑡1 ∈ 𝑇$ = {1, 2} ,	 c	∈ 𝐶 = {1,2} 	,	 0<𝑝<1,	
and	𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {201201,… ,201612} .	𝐼 	represents	 office	 actions.	 n	 do-
nates	the	total	number	of	office	actions	given	to	individual	technology	
areas.	𝑡$	denotes	the	intervention	(i.e.,	Alice	decision	or	the	PTO	im-
plementation).	𝜀 	denotes	 an	 idiosyncratic	 error	 term	 uncorrelated	
with	other	independent	variables	or	controls.		
𝑅𝑒𝑗101	indicates	whether	 examiners	 gave	 a	 §	 101	 rejection.	 It	
equals	0	when	the	office	action	was	an	allowance	and	equals	1	when	
the	 office	 action	 was	 a	 rejection.	𝑝!"#"$ 	denotes	 the	 probability	 of	
𝑅𝑒𝑗101=1.	The	D-i-D	models	estimate	the	average	degree	of	R&D	in-























































































































































































Coeff.	 1.096***	 1.185***	 0.298*	 0.339**	
S.E.	 (0.119)	 (0.124)	 (0.158)	 (0.160)	




Coeff.	 3.956***	 4.098***	 3.364***	 3.356***	
S.E.	 (0.127)	 (0.132)	 (0.189)	 (0.190)	





Coeff.	 3.032***	 3.068***	 2.448***	 2.478***	
S.E.	 (0.119)	 (0.124)	 (0.163)	 (0.165)	




Coeff.	 3.482***	 3.587***	 3.402***	 3.382***	
S.E.	 (0.132)	 (0.136)	 (0.264)	 (0.264)	





Coeff.	 2.899***	 2.897***	 2.934***	 2.911***	
S.E.	 (0.152)	 (0.155)	 (0.311)	 (0.311)	





Coeff.	 -0.210*	 -0.161	 -0.145	 -0.169	
S.E.	 (0.117)	 (0.122)	 (0.154)	 (0.156)	




Coeff.	 -0.248*	 -0.195	 -0.474**	 -0.429**	
S.E.	 (0.131)	 (0.137)	 (0.192)	 (0.195)	











S.E.	 (0.119)	 (0.124)	 (0.158)	 (0.161)	








Coeff.	 -0.169	 -0.140	 0.0669	 0.108	
S.E.	 (0.118)	 (0.123)	 (0.157)	 (0.160)	




Coeff.	 0.00513	 0.0478	 0.217	 0.256	
S.E.	 (0.119)	 (0.124)	 (0.156)	 (0.158)	








S.E.	 (0.121)	 (0.127)	 (0.159)	 (0.162)	





Coeff.	 -0.510***	 -0.536***	 -0.412**	 -0.381**	
S.E.	 (0.132)	 (0.142)	 (0.164)	 (0.167)	





Coeff.	 0.175	 0.243*	 0.456***	 0.498***	
S.E.	 (0.119)	 (0.124)	 (0.158)	 (0.160)	





Coeff.	 -0.105	 -0.141	 -0.0969	 -0.0677	
S.E.	 (0.121)	 (0.127)	 (0.159)	 (0.162)	








S.E.	 (0.121)	 (0.128)	 (0.159)	 (0.161)	








S.E.	 (0.122)	 (0.127)	 (0.162)	 (0.165)	





Coeff.	 -0.205*	 -0.212*	 0.109	 0.143	
S.E.	 (0.123)	 (0.129)	 (0.160)	 (0.163)	





Coeff.	 0.0350	 0.0841	 0.110	 0.152	
S.E.	 (0.132)	 (0.138)	 (0.169)	 (0.172)	
N.	 111,465	 103,237	 76,811	 76,452	
Telemetry	
and	Code	
Coeff.	 0.537***	 0.626***	 0.257	 0.285	














Coeff.	 0.740***	 0.986***	 0.854***	 0.934***	
S.E.	 (0.224)	 (0.227)	 (0.263)	 (0.262)	



















Coeff.		 2.581***	 3.013***	 2.593**	 2.593**	
S.E.	 (0.612)	 (0.643)	 (1.031)	 (1.031)	




Coeff.		 4.014***	 4.687***	 4.084***	 4.084***	
S.E.	 (0.636)	 (0.633)	 (0.939)	 (0.939)	





Coeff.		 3.025***	 3.651***	 2.667***	 2.603***	
S.E.	 (0.588)	 (0.545)	 (0.721)	 (0.653)	




Coeff.		 3.482***	 3.587***	 3.402***	 3.382***	
S.E.	 (0.132)	 (0.136)	 (0.264)	 (0.264)	





Coeff.		 3.760***	 3.597***	 3.006*	 3.006*	
S.E.	 (0.887)	 (0.898)	 (1.659)	 (1.659)	
	 N.	 1,252	 1,173	 268	 268	
Software	
(general)	 Coeff.		 0.568	 0.843	 0.312	 0.311	
	 S.E.	 (0.519)	 (0.541)	 (0.660)	 (0.660)	




AI	 Coeff.		 0.706	 0.974	 0.412	 0.412	
	 S.E.	 (0.597)	 (0.630)	 (0.866)	 (0.866)	






Coeff.		 0.0510	 0.223	 0.0603	 0.0605	
S.E.	 (0.515)	 (0.540)	 (0.861)	 (0.861)	





Coeff.		 0.199	 0.457	 -0.0986	 -0.0986	
S.E.	 (0.517)	 (0.541)	 (0.671)	 (0.671)	




Coeff.		 0.998*	 1.325**	 0.814	 0.814	
S.E.	 (0.550)	 (0.572)	 (0.667)	 (0.667)	




Coeff.		 0.00697	 0.352	 0.200	 0.200	
S.E.	 (0.562)	 (0.604)	 (0.773)	 (0.773)	





Coeff.		 0.780	 1.184*	 0.784	 0.784	
S.E.	 (0.665)	 (0.702)	 (0.841)	 (0.841)	
	 N.	 2,098	 1,803	 1,544	 1,544	
Computer	
Networks	 Coeff.		 0.560	 0.865	 0.634	 0.634	
	 S.E.	 (0.556)	 (0.613)	 (0.760)	 (0.760)	




Coeff.		 -0.0546	 0.283	 -0.410	 -0.410	
	 S.E.	 (0.596)	 (0.655)	 (0.850)	 (0.850)	
	 N.	 5,786	 5,303	 2,912	 2,912	
Digital	
Cameras	 Coeff.		 0.194	 0.550	 0.0836	 0.0843	
	 S.E.	 (0.616)	 (0.672)	 (0.853)	 (0.854)	




Coeff.		 0.226	 0.545	 0.574	 0.574	
S.E.	 (0.570)	 (0.619)	 (0.829)	 (0.829)	







Coeff.		 0.239	 0.627	 0.162	 0.162	
S.E.	 (0.625)	 (0.670)	 (0.840)	 (0.840)	




Coeff.		 0.942	 1.374**	 1.798*	 1.798*	
S.E.	 (0.584)	 (0.645)	 (1.064)	 (1.064)	




























𝑦"$ = 𝜆'𝑑"$ +∑ 𝜆(𝐸"$[𝑑"$)(]*)"$(+$ +∑ 𝜆(𝐸"$[𝑑"$,(]"$(+$ + 𝑒"$	(3)	
𝑑"$ = logit(𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑗101!"#"$|𝑋!"#"$])	(4)	
	
where	𝑡1 ∈ 𝑇$ = {1, 2},	 and	𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {201201,… ,201612}.	𝑡$ 	de-
notes	the	intervention	(i.e.,	Alice	decision	or	the	implementation).	𝑑"$	
denotes	the	static	D-i-D	equation.	𝑑"$,( 	are	a	sequence	of	future	val-



















context=law_and_economics	 [https://perma.cc/7CLY-62MN];	 see	 also	 Gregory	 C.	
Chow,	Rational	Versus	Adaptive	Expectations	in	Present	Value	Models,	71	REV.	ECON.	&	
STAT.	376	(1989)	(examining	rational	expectations	and	adaptive	expectations).	
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Table	D1.	Logistic	Regressions	to	Estimate	§	101	Rejections	
VARIABLES	 Business	Methods	 Bioinformatics	
(Note:	Omitted:>5	months	prior	to	Alice	decision	&	>2	months	after	Alice	decision) 	
5-Month	Prior	to	Alice	Decision	 1.409	 1.346	
	 (0.916)	 (0.917)	
4-Month	Prior	to	Alice	Decision	 2.497***	 2.429***	
	 (0.693)	 (0.690)	
3-Month	Prior	to	Alice	Decision	 2.513***	 2.466***	
	 (0.683)	 (0.680)	
2-Month	Prior	to	Alice	Decision	 2.018***	 1.985***	
	 (0.736)	 (0.736)	
1-Month	Prior	to	Alice	Decision	 1.685**	 1.659**	
	 (0.768)	 (0.766)	
Month	of	Alice	Decision	 2.549***	 2.486***	
	 (0.650)	 (0.650)	
1-Month	Post	Alice	Decision	 0.613	 0.582	
	 (0.915)	 (0.917)	
2-Month	Post	Alice	Decision	 1.210	 1.112	
	 (0.765)	 (0.766)	
5-Month	Prior	to	Alice	Decision	
×	Technology	
-1.034	 -0.915	
(0.919)	 (0.984)	
4-Month	Prior	to	Alice	Decision	
×	Technology	
-2.275***	 -1.591**	
(0.696)	 (0.795)	
3-Month	Prior	to	Alice	Decision	
×	Technology	
-2.458***	 -1.646**	
(0.687)	 (0.806)	
2-Month	Prior	to	Alice	Decision	
×	Technology	
-1.866**	 -1.365	
(0.739)	 (0.844)	
1-Month	Prior	to	Alice	Decision	
×	Technology	
-1.581**	 -1.802**	
(0.771)	 (0.851)	
Month	of	Alice	Decision	×	
Technology	
-2.440***	 -2.106***	
(0.653)	 (0.728)	
0.255	 1.021	
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1-Month	Post	Alice	Decision	×	
Technology	 (0.917)	 (0.978)	
2-Month	Post	Alice	Decision	×	
Technology	
-0.215	 0.459	
(0.767)	 (0.846)	
Constant	 -6.881***	 8.317	
	 (0.577)	 -	
Observations	 513,954	 71,355	
Pseudo	R-squared	 0.1761	 0.5665	
Note:	Whether	the	office	action	also	includes	a	§	102,	§	103,	or	§	112	rejection	is	inde-
pendently	controlled	as	fixed	in	the	model.	Time	(month)	is	a	fixed	control	in	the	model.	
Technology	center	is	controlled	as	fixed.	James	Stock’s	Heteroskedasticity-standard	errors	
are	shown	in	parentheses,	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.,	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1.	
	
	
